Qualcomm and Teleepoch
Enter Into a 3G CDMA Subscriber Unit License Agreement, October
6, 2007
MTN chooses Cambridge Broadband
Networks for multi-service wireless network in Rwanda, October 6,
2007
Brazilian government to
publish 3G bidding rules soon, October 6, 2007
KTF 3G service suffers
from technical problems, October 6, 2007
Argentina’s Personal
lunches 3G service in Rosario, October 6, 2007
Russia has it's first 3G
network, October 6, 2007
AT&T could drop Alcatel-Lucent
as 3G mobile network supplier, October 6, 2007
Enea Extends License Agreement
with ZTE for 3G Handsets, October 2, 2007
LG to unveil premium handsets
in Brazil, October 2, 2007
KTF 3G subscribers doubled
in less than 3 months, October 2, 2007
3G policy in India will
be non-uniform, October 2, 2007
- previous news
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UMTS can stop hijackers said Catapult
August 11, 2002
Network hijackers have been known to challenge GSM networks in
a variety of ways. For example, false Base Stations can be deployed
to eavesdrop on user data. To face these challenges, GSM networks
offer a set of security functions to ensure the anonymity, integrity,
confidentiality and billing (authentication) for users. The GSM
security functions include Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), User
Authentication, and Radio Interface Encryption. However, with the
evolution of the 3G-UMTS cellular system, stronger security functions
are required said Catapult.
UMTS is built on the security of GSM and follows three principles:
1) keep the proven GSM security features to ensure the compatibility
for inter-working and handover; 2) address the weaknesses of GSM
security; and 3) add security features for new 3G radio access networks
and services.
The following table shows the main UMTS security enhancements compared
to GSM:
| Security Elements |
GSM Security Services |
GSM Security Problems |
UMTS Security Enhancements |
Anonymity
Protect the identity and location of a user |
1. Use Temporary ID: TMSI
2. Use SIM as security model |
Lack of visibility: user does not know the encryption is on |
1. Allow user to enable/disable USIM authentication
2. Add anonymity algorithms: f5 & f5* |
Integrity
Protect the user signaling and data over the radio path |
Not Available |
No data integrity algorithm |
1. Add data Integrity algorithm: f9
2. Add integrity key derivation: f4 |
Confidentiality
Ensure messages are not available to unauthorized individuals
|
Use encryption algorithms: A5 series and A8 |
Key Transmission: ciphering keys are not secure |
Add confidentiality algorithm: f8 |
| Weak Encryption: short key lengths, hard to upgrade algorithm |
Longer key length, easy to upgrade |
| Inflexibility: difficult to upgrade security functions |
Security features can be upgraded |
| Limited Encryption scope: only access security (MS to BTS) |
Ciphering extended to RNC |
| Billing (Authentication) Issue billing to the right people
|
1. Use "Challenge and Response" Authentication algorithm A3.
2. Use Authentication Triplets: SRES, RAND, Kc |
Unilateral Authentication: only from user to the network |
1. Mutual Authentication: user can also identify the network.
2. Authentication Quintet: XRES, RAND, CK, AUTN and IK.
3. Add random challenge generating function: f0.
4. Add authentication functions: f1, f1* & f2.
5. Add cipher key derivation: f3. |
We can see that many security problems in GSM have been addressed
by UMTS. In addition, UMTS supports new security functions such
as new ciphering algorithms. Today, there are nine UMTS algorithms
among which two are standardized: f8 (confidentiality) and f9 (integrity).
Catapult introduces a new product that can support these UMTS standardized
algorithms on the DCT2000 test platform.
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3G Motorola A920
